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Navigating Veterinary Borderlands: ‘Heiferlumps’, Epidemiological  
Boundaries and the Control of Animal Disease in New Zealand 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the importance of boundaries in the control of animal 
disease. On the one hand, establishing geographical and disciplinary 
boundaries is seen to be vital to the control of disease. In practice, however, 
boundaries are unstable, disrupted and frequently transgressed. Disease and 
its diagnosis vary in space, whilst disciplinary boundaries between 
epidemiology, laboratory and clinical practices can collapse from the 
noncoherence of disease. Drawing on the concepts of ‘disciplinary 
borderlands’ and fluid space, the paper analyses how uncertainty over 
disease diagnosis establishes a veterinary borderland in which disciplines are 
merged and combined and difficult to tell apart. From archival research and 
interviews of key informants, the paper describes the history of the control of 
bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) in New Zealand. Focussing on disputes around the 
diagnosis of bTB in the West Coast region, the paper shows how the problem 
of non-specificity (locally referred to as ‘heiferlumps’) undermined attempts to 
impose a universal version of disease and control policy. In this new 
veterinary borderland, attempts to manage the noncoherence of disease 
shifted from denial to viewing disease as a moral problem in which farmers’ 
own knowledges were central to the definition and management of disease. In 
doing so, boundaries between traditional disease disciplines were broken 
down, and new hybrid veterinary practices established to create 
geographically variable disease control rules and procedures. In conclusion, 
the paper considers the wider consequences for the management of animal 
disease arising from greater farmer involvement in animal disease 
management. 
 
	 	
Introduction 
 
“Infectious disease knows no boundaries, especially in today’s 
increasingly mobile world” (Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 2011) 
 
There is a paradox in disease control: if disease knows no boundary, why are 
boundaries required to control it? Boundaries are central to attempts to control 
disease. Geographical techniques map and define zones of disease and 
surveillance, whilst rules are created to control who and what can pass across 
them (Higgins & Dibden, 2011). Coherent boundaries are sought to define 
what disease is: in seeking to eliminate diseases like Tuberculosis, Fogel 
(2015:  527) argues that ‘conceptual and clear understandings’ of disease are 
pre-requisites for disease eradication. Meanwhile, different veterinary 
traditions not only invoke distinct ways of understanding disease, but are 
bounded by their own distinct physical and cultural geographies (Enticott, 
2014b). Thus, when the concept of ‘one-health’ (Zinsstag et al., 2011) 
encourages disciplinary boundary crossings, there remains a tendency to 
seek singular, universal and coherent versions of disease by ‘reduc[ing] 
diversity and to under-value the local, contingent and practical engagements 
that make health possible’ (Hinchliffe, 2015:  28).  
 
In this bounded world, the geography of disease and its dividing practices 
should be clear-cut. Yet, the purpose of this paper is to document how, in 
practice, these boundaries are unstable, disrupted and frequently 
transgressed. The paper concentrates on two ways in which the boundaries of 
animal disease control are challenged, blurred and remade. Firstly, the 
concept of ‘non-specificity’ frustrates attempts to define the presence and 
absence of disease. Non-specificity refers to interferences to diagnostic tests, 
causing false positive results that emerge from localised environmental, 
geological, climatic, and biological matter. The non-specific quality to these 
relations means that diagnostic tests are rarely perfect, working well in some 
places but not in others and requiring constant adaption to make health and 
disease control possible (Hinchliffe, 2015). In doing so, non-specificity directs 
attention to the unpredictable relational mixes that come to define disease 
(Hinchliffe & Lavau, 2013) and the vibrant materialities (Bennett, 2010) that 
make defining and identifying disease open to constant change.  
 
Secondly, if non-specificity makes the nature of animal disease elusive, it 
raises questions of how veterinary disciplines not only cope with non-specific 
relations, but the extent to which these disciplines are themselves discrete 
and bounded. For Law and Mol (2011:  2), different veterinary traditions – 
those of the clinic, epidemiology and the laboratory – enact ‘their own specific 
ontological variant of ‘the’ disease’, and mobilise different spatial relations and 
materials. Previous research suggests the boundaries between these 
disciplines and their version of disease are vigorously patrolled and disputed 
(Bickerstaff & Simmons, 2004). However, their accompanying claims of the 
singularity of disease belie tensions between different ways of knowing 
disease. Just as non-specificity challenges the boundaries of disease, so too 
are the boundaries of the disciplines of disease control unlikely to be so rigid. 
As Mol and Law (1994) suggest, different knowledge practices can find ways 
of living together and shift seamlessly between each other. Rather, in dealing 
with the challenge of non-specificity, different modes of resolving the 
‘noncoherence’ of disease (Law et al., 2014) are likely to be found in the 
spaces between veterinary practices – what Kohler (2002) refers to as a 
‘disciplinary borderland’. The result is not just different versions of animal 
disease, but hybrid ways of knowing and controlling it. 
 
In focussing on the challenge of non-specificity, this paper explores the fusing 
and folding together of different veterinary traditions in a veterinary 
disciplinary borderland. Specifically, it focuses on how different 
understandings of bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) became entangled in response 
to farmers’ and vets’ concerns about the problem of non-specificity – or what 
they referred to as ‘heiferlumps’ – in the West Coast of New Zealand. In doing 
so, it describes the emergence of a disciplinary ‘borderland’ (Kohler, 2002) in 
which different ‘modes of noncoherence’ (Law et al., 2014) contributed to the 
development of new methods of disease control. The paper begins by setting 
these approaches in context by analysing the practices and spatial relations of 
different veterinary traditions, and the circumstances in which they combine 
and form ‘fluid space’ (Mol & Law, 1994). In describing this new geography of 
animal disease, the paper considers the wider importance for animal disease 
management as a whole. 
 
Geographies of Veterinary Practices 
Veterinary epidemiology studies the causes, distribution, and diffusion of 
disease within populations, and seeks to identify the biological, environmental, 
behavioural and socio-economic determinants of disease. Historically, 
however, the status of epidemiology has always been under pressure from 
other disciplines. Parascandola (1998) suggests that epidemiologists have 
always been concerned with their standards of proof compared to ‘real’ 
knowledge from the laboratory or clinical practices. Epidemiologists’ resulting 
‘disciplinary status anxiety’ (Amsterdamska, 2005:  44) has driven various 
forms of disciplinary ‘boundary work’ (Gieryn, 1999) that stress epidemiology’s 
unique methodological combination of clinical and statistical expertise.  
Epidemiology’s spatial discourse, techniques and practices are also part of 
this boundary work. Disease mapping is a central component of the 
epidemiologists armoury, whilst the spatialities of epidemiology are also 
evident in its attempts to define risk factors and provide a general overview of 
the conditions in which disease is transmitted.  
 
Evident in disease outbreaks such as the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom, the spatiality underpinning 
epidemiology is different to other disciplines. For Law and Mol (2011:  13) 
epidemiology enacts a spatial pattern that is universal, drawing ‘cartographic 
maps that allow it to depict relations between sites [and which] enacts space 
as a flat surface…Reality is spread out on the two dimensions of a sheet of 
paper or a whiteboard, or the screen of a computer’. In seeking to create an 
overview, epidemiology differs from laboratory work that seeks to connect 
identical places. Through identical protocols and procedures, laboratory work 
flattens space, drawing together places to make them similar, permitting 
laboratories to act at a distance (Latour, 1988). At the same time, the 
invariability of laboratory work results in a ‘placeless’ landscape in which the 
specificities of place are erased to provide scientific credibility (Kohler, 2002). 
A third way of knowing disease – clinical practice – has a different spatial 
perspective again. Clinical practice has an immediacy that fractures standards 
and works to establish a variable spatial plane. The identification of disease 
comes to rest on the situation at hand: disease can look, sound and feel 
different depending on context. What distinguishes clinical practice from 
epidemiology is its spatial attunement and adaptability that makes clinical 
practice highly mobile (Mather & Marshall, 2011).  
 
Disease outbreaks such as FMD and bTB in the UK have highlighted how the 
spatial differences between epidemiology and other ways knowing disease 
appear vast enough as to be irreconcilable (Bickerstaff & Simmons, 2004; 
Enticott, 2001). However, the boundaries between them may not be so clear-
cut after-all. Take the differences between clinical practice and epidemiology. 
Whilst the former may be lauded for its mutability and accommodation of 
difference, the temporality of epidemiology provides it with no closure. 
Instead, it is marked by an iterative process of ‘continuously remaking the 
grounds and conditions of its own investigations’ (Law & Mol, 2011:  12). 
Problems of distinguishing epidemiology from clinical practice are highlighted 
further when epidemiological techniques are examined in practice. Diagnosis 
is central to all three forms of veterinary practice but in use, diagnostic tools 
and materials turn out to be malleable, not universal (Mather, 2014). 
Controlling disease becomes less about boundaries and fixed objects and 
more about the ‘intense entanglements’ found in the ‘borderlands’ of 
biosecurity (Hinchliffe et al., 2013:  13; Hinchliffe & Lavau, 2013). 
 
If the boundaries between veterinary disciplines are in fact blurred, then for 
Mol and Law (1994), they can be seen as movements between different forms 
of space. Laboratories and epidemiology seek to create regional topologies in 
which immutable veterinary tools and practices bring together far away 
places. Networks, though, have limits. Tools and practices can become 
mutable, but this does not mean disease control grinds to a halt. The failure of 
the laboratory or of epidemiology to impose uniform standards to get specific 
versions of disease to ‘work’ can open gaps for adaptable clinical practices 
(Enticott, 2012). These forms of animal disease ‘local universality’ 
(Timmermans & Berg, 1997) or ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Christley et al., 2013) 
may appear to be just another diagnostic network topology, but Mol and Law 
suggest an alternative: that different knowledge practices can live together 
and shift between each other seamlessly in a fluid space.  Fluid space is 
marked by ‘variation without boundaries and transformation without 
discontinuity’ (Mol & Law, 1994:  658) in which ‘it is not possible to determine 
identities nice and neatly, once and for all’ (Mol & Law, 1994:  660).  
Boundaries between diseased and healthy, or between diagnosis and 
treatment are never fixed, the movement between them unpredictable. As a 
result, animal disease control will be marked by gradients, not boundaries. 
Distinguishing between different disease practices is difficult as different 
disease practices can comfortably sit alongside each other (Mol, 2002).  
 
Thinking of disease control as a fluid space characterised by porous 
boundaries reflects broader thinking of the geography of scientific disciplines. 
Writing about the distinction between field and laboratory biology, Kohler 
(2002) notes that distinct disciplines do not live in isolation: they pay attention 
to each, meeting in a ‘zone of active interaction and exchange’ or what 
Galison (1996) refers to as a ‘trading zone’. In these borderlands, spaces are 
created in which opposing practices combine and evolve into novel forms. For 
Kohler, the result is mixed practices and ambiguous identities that can be as 
much of the laboratory as of the field. By focussing on these disciplinary 
borderlands, Kohler directs attention to understanding how disciplinary 
boundaries come to be blurred and the circumstances in which hybrid 
practices are formed. Kohler (2002) suggests that disciplinary borderlands are 
created from dissatisfaction and anxieties with old scientific regimes. As 
attempts at reform, they reflect the socio-political landscape of scientific life, 
made more or less important by institutions, social values and the deployment 
of scientific practices in new contexts (Sinding, 2004). Successful exchanges 
across borderlands can be dependent on who is attempting to mix disciplines: 
the social standing and experience of participants, the cultural proximity 
between disciplines and their history of borderland occupation. Importantly, 
navigating disciplinary borderlands requires geographical ‘know-how’ and 
judgement in order to identify when and where border practices are ‘do-able’ 
(Kohler, 2002:  131-133).  In a similar way, Law et al. (2014) describe how 
modes and ecologies of syncretism – such as ignorance, denial and care – 
are central to ways of living with the noncoherence of opposing practices. 
Care, for example, allows noncoherence to be dealt with by striking imperfect, 
provisional and adaptable balances (Mol, 2008). Meanwhile, a strategies of 
ignorance and denial creation of ‘zones of illegibility and ignorance’ which 
help deny the existence of opposing practices (Mathews, 2005:  797) and 
ensure the smooth running of methods that struggle to adapt to local contexts 
(Singleton & Law, 2013).  
 
Thus, the boundaries of disease control disciplines should not be thought of 
as ‘homogenous and hermetically sealed conceptual entities, but rather 
dynamic configurations of practices and ideas which, under appropriate 
conditions, can be combined – more or less successfully – with other 
configurations’ (Amsterdamska, 2004:  505). Like Kohler’s (2002:  11) 
examination of field and laboratory biology, so too should we expect 
disciplinary exchanges where disease control practices are as much of one as 
the other, yet reflecting the specificities of place. We should therefore expect 
veterinary traditions to be both heterogeneous and fluid, be attentive to the 
specificities of place and reflective of institutional and social changes. The rest 
of this paper examines how in the course of dealing with non-specificity, 
epidemiology started to flow with other veterinary disciplines to become as 
elusive as disease itself. 
 
Geographies of Controlling Bovine Tuberculosis in New Zealand 
Methodological Notes 
 
In April 2013, the UK Government’s Secretary of State for the Environment 
flew to New Zealand to see how the country’s Animal Health Board (AHB) had 
dramatically reduced the number of herds infected with bovine Tuberculosis 
(bTB)1. The subsequent bTB eradication strategy for England (Defra, 2014) 
mentioned New Zealand 18 times and argued strongly for the need to follow 
their approach to disease eradication. In fact, both countries had attempted to 
learn from each other’s approach to bTB from the 1950s, with scientists and 
policy makers sharing reciprocal visits and attending the same conferences. 
In this context of international policy mobility, the research on which this paper 
draws, set out to investigate the global mobility of disease control practices. In 
particular, the research focused on specific modalities of disease control 
within New Zealand, principally the use of the Caudal Fold Test (CFT) to 
detect bTB and the role of Risk Based Trading to reduce the translocation of 
disease (see Enticott, 2016). 
 
Examining the status of the CFT as a Latourian obligatory passage point in 
New Zealand’s control of disease, led to a typical Actor-Network Theory 
‘following the actors’ style of inquiry and grounded theory approach to 
analysis. During trips to New Zealand between 2011 – 14, thirty interviews 
were conducted with the architects of New Zealand’s bTB policy, Animal 
Health Board vets, scientists, and farming organisations, as well as 
ethnographic observation of veterinary technicians testing cattle for bTB. 
Whilst ‘official’ histories of bTB eradication in New Zealand failed to mention 
any ‘messiness’ to disease eradication (Animal Health Board., 2012; 
																																								 																					
1	In	1995	there	were	1462	infected	cattle	herds	in	New	Zealand.	By	2015	there	were	just	
41	(OSPRI,	2015).	
Nightingale, 1992), interviews with vets revealed the curiously named problem 
of ‘heiferlumps’ connected to non-specificity in New Zealand’s West Coast 
region. Subsequent analysis of the archives of the Department of Agriculture 
provided greater insight to disputes over the bTB programme. Further 
interviews were conducted with vets who had worked in the West Coast 
during these disputes, former chief veterinary officers, and with colleagues 
and relatives of key figures in the dispute – Sam Jamieson and Peter Malone 
(both deceased). Finally, forty farmers were interviewed, 20 of whom lived in 
the farming community of Karamea in the West Coast, about the historical 
and contemporary use of the CFT and the challenge non-specificity presents 
to bTB testing in the area.  
 
The subsequent analysis describes the geography of three different 
approaches to resolving non-specific reactions to bTB testing in New Zealand. 
These are presented in turn: firstly, a variable clinical approach used by 
private vets is described; secondly, epidemiological and laboratory based 
approaches which sought to deny the presence of non-specificity and 
discipline farmers into accepting a universal version of bTB; and finally, a 
hybrid approach combining different perspectives to resolve the problem of 
non-specificity, in which different spatial relations merge and are difficult to 
separate. As such, the analysis reveals how different approaches to disease 
control have evolved and clashed over time, and the circumstances that 
contributed to a veterinary borderland in which practices merged. As the 
analysis shows, transitions between these practices were not in any way easy 
or expected. Indeed, as the analysis shows, these approaches are inter-
related and the transitions between them are not clearly defined. It is also 
interesting to note that this account of the realities of disease control is absent 
from other historical narratives of disease control in New Zealand, and 
appears to be one that some participants may have deliberately sought to 
forget. 
 
Non-specific Beginnings: Heiferlumps and ‘Reading Light’ in Clinical Space 
 In 1945, legislation was enacted in New Zealand that required compulsory 
bTB testing for all dairy herds, commonly known as town milk supply herds2. 
Negotiations between farmers organisations and the Department of 
Agriculture 3  meant its implementation was delayed until 1961 (Davidson, 
2002). In the meantime, town milk supply herds were tested on a voluntary 
basis with worrying results: 10% of cattle were testing positive, and farmers’ 
confidence in the bTB test had been “shattered”. Few were visibly sick or 
wasting away: ‘some of them were [the farmer’s] best cows. Lively as crickets. 
Producing milk at every milking to capacity. [Farmers] made no secret of their 
anger and despair. Who could blame them?’4. 
 
In 1961, the Department gradually began to introduce the eradication 
programme across New Zealand. As it did so, the programme began to 
encounter resistance from farmers, particularly in the South Island’s West 
Coast region. On 5th August 1963, the Tadmor-Matariki branch of Federated 
Farmers wrote to the Minister of Agriculture Brian Talboys expressing their 
“grave concern…at the slaughter of animals, which were reacting to the 
Tuberculin Test, and at slaughter no evidence of TB could be found”5. The 
letter set out farmers’ concerns over the reliability of the Caudal Fold Test 
used to diagnose bTB, arguing that, ”it fails to differentiate in a positive re-
action between bovine Tb and non-specific sources. This being the case, 
needless slaughter of animals will continue”6. 
																																								 																					
	
2	AAFB	632	W4914/188	246/62/1	Tuberculosis	–	Bovine	TB	–	Testing	for	disease	in	
dairy	herds	1939	–	1967.	“The	history	and	progress	of	the	Town	Milk	Supply	Tuberculin	
Testing	Scheme’	ADMG	Laing,	New	Zealand	Veterinary	Conference,	4th	February	1955.	
3	The	Department	of	Agriculture	was	renamed	several	times.	For	the	sake	of	consistency,	
the	paper	referred	to	‘the	Department’	throughout.		
4	ACCR	7837	W5124/1	Unpublished	manuscript	on	the	History	of	the	Animal	Health	
Division	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture.	Chapter	3:	Control	of	Indigenous	Infectious	
Diseases,	unpublished	manuscript,	p.24.	(Authors	S.	Jamieson	and	C.	Ensor)	1985.	
5	AAFZ	7174	W5705/227	21207A/1	Tuberculin	Testing	TTO	[Technical	Training	
Officer]	–	Appointments	–	Disciplinary	Action	–	PH	Malone	1963-64.	“’Strike	Action’	By	
Famers	In	Tadmor-Matariki”	Nelson	Evening	Mail,	16th	August,	1963.	
6	AAFZ	7174	W1634/33	21136/3	Tuberculosis	Advisory	Committee	1963-65.	‘TB	
Testing	in	Tadmor	Area	Halted’,	Nelson	Evening	Mail	23rd	October,	1963.	
 In concluding their letter, the Tadmor-Matariki farmers presented a 99-name 
petition asking the Department to investigate. Not soon after, farmers decided 
to take matters into their own hands. On 16th August, the Nelson Evening Mail 
announced that farmers in Tadmor-Matariki were to strike and refuse to test 
their cattle7. By 17th October, 1963, the Minister of Agriculture wrote to the 
Tadmor-Matariki farmers acceding to their requests and formally announcing 
that bTB tests would be suspended throughout the area whilst investigations 
were undertaken8. The farmers’ vet – Peter Malone – also expressed his 
support for the decision saying: “the Department has failed to accept the field 
evidence which shows that the great preponderance of reactors are young 
animals. Few of these animals on slaughter have been found to have 
tuberculosis…Gross differences in results …have highlighted our ignorance of 
causes of sensitivity and work will have to be done on this”9. 
 
In fact, Peter Malone had supported and encouraged protests from these and 
other farmers that he served on the West Coast. Flying into the remote 
settlement of Karamea in his plane every week, Malone adopted a pragmatic 
view to veterinary practice, his style of thought far removed from that in the 
Department. Charismatic and eloquent if not eccentric, he was trusted by the 
farmers who experienced his work at first hand. Farmers in Karamea were 
reported to be in ‘panic’ because of what they referred to as the ‘heifer reactor 
problem’ or ‘heiferlumps’ – a disproportionate number of heifers reacting to 
																																								 																					
7	AAFZ	7174	W5705/227	21207A/1	Tuberculin	Testing	TTO	[Technical	Training	
Officer]	–	Appointments	–	Disciplinary	Action	–	PH	Malone	1963-64.	“’Strike	Action’	By	
Famers	In	Tadmor-Matariki”	Nelson	Evening	Mail,	16th	August,	1963.	‘Farmers	Refuse	to	
Comply	with	Tb	Test	Direction’	Nelson	Evening	Mail,	27th	September	1963.	
8	AAFZ	7174	W5705/227	21207A/1	Tuberculin	Testing	TTO	[Technical	Training	
Officer]	–	Appointments	–	Disciplinary	Action	–	PH	Malone	1963-64.	“’Strike	Action’	
Decision.	Minister	Asks	Tadmor	Farmers	to	Reconsider’	Nelson	Evening	Mail,	6th	
September	1963.	‘	TB	Testing	in	Tadmor	Area	Halted’	Nelson	Evening	Mail,	23rd	October,	
1963.	
9	AAFZ	7174	W1634/33	21136/3	Tuberculosis	Advisory	Committee	1963-65.	‘TB	
Testing	in	Tadmor	Area	Halted’,	Nelson	Evening	Mail	23rd	October,	1963.	
the bTB test10. Malone raised these concerns at a meeting of vets in February 
1963, pointing out that heifers were reacting but failing to display lesions at 
slaughter and requested that these heifers be retested 6 months later11.  
 
Although bTB appeared to be rising in Karamea, at a meeting in Murchison in 
April 196312, Malone suggested that this was down to a change in the bTB 
testing regulations that had left little room for interpretating lumps found at the 
bTB test. Prior to this, Malone argued, vets throughout the region had taken a 
view on whether the cattle were infected or displaying non-specific reactions 
caused by biological or local environmental conditions. This was contrary to 
the Department’s regulations that ruled any swelling must be defined as a 
reactor. Instead, Malone argued that ‘it depends on the size of the swelling 
before he decides whether it is a reactor or not’, a method he called ‘reading 
light’13. Malone’s version of bTB testing is a clear reflection of the thinking of 
the clinic and the practical creation and application of veterinary knowledge, 
similar to the forms of local universality that Enticott (2012) would later identify 
amongst bTB testers in the UK. Malone described ‘reading light’ as requiring 
sensitivity to local conditions, experience and knowledge of the area14. It was 
no wonder, Malone argued, that his newly employed vet had found so many 
																																								 																					
10	AAFZ	7174	W5705/227	21207A/1	Tuberculin	Testing	TTO	[Technical	Training	
Officer]	–	Appointments	–	Disciplinary	Action	–	PH	Malone	1963-64.	‘Young	Stock	
Problem	In	Tuberculosis	Herds’	Westport	News,	4th	April	1963.	
11	AAFZ	7174	W5705/227	21207A/1	Tuberculin	Testing	TTO	[Technical	Training	
Officer]	–	Appointments	–	Disciplinary	Action	–	PH	Malone	1963-64.	Letter	to	the	
Director	of	the	Animal	Health	Division,	MC	Armstrong	(Livestock	Superintendent,	
Christchurch)	March	4th,	1963.	“Report	on	Tuberculosis	Control	–	February	1963”.	
12	AAFZ	7174	W5705/227	21207A/1	Tuberculin	Testing	TTO	[Technical	Training	
Officer]	–	Appointments	–	Disciplinary	Action	–	PH	Malone	1963-64.	Minutes	of	
Federated	Farmers	Meeting,	Murchison,	29th	April,	1963.	
13 	AAFZ	 7174	 W5705/227	 21207A/1	 Tuberculin	 Testing	 TTO	 [Technical	 Training	
Officer]	 –	 Appointments	 –	 Disciplinary	 Action	 –	 PH	Malone	 1963-64.	 Nelson	 Evening	
Mail	 30th,	 April,	 1964.	 Minutes	 of	 Federated	 Farmers	 Meeting,	 Murchison,	 29th	 April,	
1963.	 Copy	 of	 a	 report	 on	 Tb	Matters	 recently	 prepared	 by	Mr	 P.	Malone,	 Veterinary	
Surgeon,	 Nelson,	 and	 submitted	 to	 the	 Tb	 Technical	 Committee	 on	 3	 June	 1964	 by	
Secretary,	Tadmor	Matariki	Special	Tb	Committee.	
14	AAFZ	W1634	7174	Box	3	/	21136	/	2	Tuberculosis	Advisory	Committee	1962-3.	
Letter	to	DNR	Webb	Chairman,	TB	Advisory	Committee	from	Peter	Malone,	7th	August,	
1963.	
reactors in Karamea without having time to develop the experience Malone 
had.  
 
When the Department found out about Malone’s methods, he was suspended 
from bTB testing, but farmers continued to trust and support him. The 
Department subsequently sent its Assistant Director – George Adlam – to 
investigate the heiferlump problem in Karamea. Reporting back that farmers’ 
concerns revolved around ‘the same story about the large number of reactors 
in the two-year old class’, Adlam suggested that farmers in Karamea ‘feel they 
have been neglected, exploited and forgotten over the years. They are 
convinced that they cannot expect help and understanding from the central 
government, and this persecution complex has been strengthened further by 
the knowledge that the one man who has helped them, and tried to bring their 
difficulties over high losses from TB testing to the attention of Wellington, has 
been penalised by having his licence cancelled’15. Adlam concluded his report 
by suggesting that the Department needed to show concern for the fate of 
farmers and investigate the problem of high reactor rates among young adult 
cattle. For the moment, at least, it was clear that the clinical style of thought 
was a long way from any approach the Department could entertain. There 
was considerable physical, practical and cultural distance between Malone’s 
approach, and that of the Department. 
 
Denying Non-Specificity: The Laboratory and the Universal Spaces of 
Disease 
 
The Department recognised that complaints about bTB testing had become a 
serious drain on resources. At the meeting of the National TB Advisory 
Committee in April 1964, the Department complained that ‘troublemakers’ and 
‘dissident farmers’ were disrupting meetings about bTB and that ‘farmers were 
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not prepared to listen to logical arguments’16. Eradication had always been 
based on maintaining New Zealand’s beef and dairy exports: with those 
framed as threatened, the chairman of the Dairy Board, Sir Linton Andrews, 
was drafted in to convince farmers of the value of the eradication scheme, 
warning them that ‘if they continued to ‘agitate’ about the tests the entire 
scheme could be broken down…[and] we shall no longer be able to compete 
and the economic situation will be grave’17. 
The Department’s response reflected two key elements in their style of 
thought: the unshakeable belief in the power of laboratory science; and their 
status as a paternalistic leader in disease control. Farmers needed to be 
disciplined into accepting bTB science and would need to educate themselves 
about the value of bTB eradication, but they would not interfere with the 
Department’s scientific approach to bTB. In this view, disease was disease: it 
would be the same everywhere, and non-specific reactions would not interfere 
with this universal geography. A reliance on laboratory science as a form of 
establishing universal disease and discipline farmers had always been a 
cornerstone of the Department’s approach to bTB. In 1952, the first formal 
plan for bTB eradication in New Zealand (known as the ‘Leslie Plan’) stressed 
that ‘education of the farming community [is] the first step in any scheme of 
the elimination of bovine Tuberculosis’18. To begin with, the Department relied 
upon a public demonstration of the CFT. At the 1953 Veterinary Services 
Council, two Department vets publicly interpreted the results of a bTB test on 
52 cattle before submitting the cattle for a post-mortem. Both vets 
independently identified the same 18 cows that reacted to the test and the 
post-mortem found each contained bTB lesions. Whilst agricultural field 
demonstrations are often considered compelling evidence (Latour, 1988; 
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Henke, 2000), in this case ‘they did little to calm the dairy industry on the 
reliability of the tuberculin test’19. Continued farmers’ strikes and veterinarians’ 
clinical interpretation of the test results led the Department to return to the 
laboratory to prove that the test was immutable and the disease universal. In 
1963 the Department commissioned a large-scale trial of the bTB test at Flock 
House, an agricultural college near Bulls on the North Island. The experiment 
railroaded 550 cattle to Flock House where they were subjected to a range of 
different diagnostic tests, before being slaughtered and examined for bTB 
lesions.  
 
The Flock House experiment concluded in 1964 and the results made public. 
For the Department, the experiment confirmed their view: bTB was identical 
throughout New Zealand and the caudal fold test was the best available to 
detect it. Farmers, however, took a different view. Concentrating on the rate of 
false positives, newspapers reported their despair at the number of ‘wasted’ 
cattle that were slaughtered following a false positive test20. If the laboratory 
was supposed to establish the immutability of disease diagnosis and provide 
power to the Department, it failed. Rejecting the ‘placelessness of laboratory 
knowledge’ (Kohler, 2002) and the need to situate animal disease knowledge 
in place, Peter Malone was unimpressed, arguing the experiment failed to 
reflect the reality of field diagnosis: ‘as experiments using only cull cows, they 
could in NO way demonstrate the picture likely to be met in the field…the 
conclusions must have been doubted by every veterinarian who was actually 
testing under field conditions’21. Instead, those responsible for analysing the 
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Flock House experiment realised that it ‘didn’t change anybody’s positions: 
those who were against the scheme used the evidence of the non-specificity 
of the caudal fold test as an argument against it’22. Instead, the Department 
simply tried to ‘wear the bastards down’23.  
 
The reliance on the laboratory as a disciplinary tool reflected the belief in the 
Department that their role was to eradicate bTB. Referring to farmers and vets 
as bastards might have been a turn of phrase, but the atmosphere between 
the Department in Wellington, and farmers and vets on the distant and 
independently minded West Coast was ‘toxic’24. It underlined the extent to 
which the Department believed farmers’ understandings and disease control 
practices were aberrant and in need of control. This attitude came right from 
the top of the bTB programme. Led by Dr Sam Jamieson, any approach that 
was not backed up in science was wrong. Clinical interpretations of the 
meaning of test results, variation, flexibility and accommodation of difference 
were not Jamieson’s way of doing things. Jamieson had completed a PhD in 
microbiology at Aberdeen University before falling into bTB after emigrating to 
New Zealand, and this laboratory training was central to his dismissal of 
clinical interpretations of bTB test results: ‘Sam being a scientist he went the 
scientific way – [he’d say] “its either a bloody reactor or its not! It doesn’t 
matter if you get 95% prevalence or not, zilch per cent prevalence, the test is 
the same!”’25 . This meant that the universal immutable standards of the 
laboratory applied everywhere. For Departmental vets, claims of non-specific 
reactions were treated speciously: ‘it wasn’t a major problem… there was 
never anything to it as far as I was concerned it was a bloody myth that local 
farmers had convinced themselves was the truth’26.  
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This did not mean that Jamieson was blind to the concept of non-specificity. 
Indeed, the Department used an alternative test – the short thermal test – in 
cases where they suspected non-specificity. However, its use was rigorously 
controlled reflecting the Department’s desire to control what counted as 
disease. Jamieson believed non-specificity was just ‘what you made it’: of 
value to the academic ‘perfectionist’ but not a national eradication scheme27. 
Non-specificity might become apparent in some areas in the later stages of 
eradication, he thought, but that time had not arrived. Instead, Jamieson 
argued that non-specificity was only of ‘temporary persistence’ and told 
farmers that it would not happen in a ‘big way’ so there was little point 
establishing investigation areas28. Thus, a mode of denial was central to the 
Department’s attempt to deal with the noncoherence of its scheme. If non-
specificity did exist, it was simply collateral damage that farmers needed to 
put up with for the good of the programme. As one former chief vet put it, “the 
Department took the line that a bit of pain upfront was a hell of a lot better 
than dragging things out…we knew that we were forcing farmers to slaughter 
animals that probably weren’t infected, we also knew that we were taking out 
the ones that were”29. Jamieson’s view of bTB control therefore revolved 
around an ‘objective uniform system of interpretation of the tuberculin test’. 
Failure to establish objective standards would be ‘a major factor in bringing a 
national eradication programme into disrepute’ 30 . Denying non-specificity 
therefore reflected the way the disease programme was thought of at the time: 
it was a job for Government who expected farmers and vets to do as they 
were told. This paternalistic style of governance both reflected and was 
informed by the scientific, laboratory reliant form of disease control.  
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If fluid geographies are related to skills and technologies, then Jamieson’s 
vision of a universal disease and denial of non-specificity was much to do with 
his scientific and personal leadership. In an interview shortly before 
retirement, Jamieson admitted that, ‘I don’t make any bones about how I feel 
toward people who have a half-knowledge [about my field]’31. Jamieson’s 
obituary described him as an ‘autocrat’ whose meetings with farmers 
‘generated heat as well as light’ (Davidson, 1987). For colleagues, he ‘took a 
no-nonsense stand to the whole issue of TB control…If colleagues came and 
put some clearly unscientific proposition, he gave them both barrels… he 
expected more of them, and when they didn’t, when they put up fallacious 
arguments, he gave it to them. He wasn’t a politician in that sense’32. So, 
when it when it came to dealing with Peter Malone’s clinical approach to 
testing, Jamieson was forthright, suspending him from duty, condemning his 
unscientific approach and restating a universal geography of disease with the 
Department at its centre: 
‘I look with some dismay – quite a bit more than dismay really – on 
statements which imply that the facts, which are true facts, do not 
actually exist because they can cause interminable confusion in the 
minds of farmers. The departmental veterinarian in the district is the 
only person in a position to know the overall picture and this kind of 
statement sets us back all the time in getting rid of bovine TB as fast as 
we can’33 
 
Yet Jamieson’s suspension of Malone, his denial of non-specificity, and his 
universal geography of disease was fundamental in pushing farmers towards 
a strike. When he toured the South Island to address farmers’ concerns, his 
determination to deny that there was no problem with the test shone through. 
At a meeting in the Rai Valley in April 1964, Jamieson confronted a farmer 
who dared to suggest that the bTB test was wrong:  
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Dr Jamieson: Well please tell us what is wrong with it? 
Mr Hislop: Well to start with I think young cows should not be tested – 
it upsets them. 
Dr Jamieson: You mean to tell me that too many of your young cows 
are reactors? 
Mr  Hislop: Yes 
Dr Jamieson: Well the reason why there are more young cows among 
the reactors is that tuberculosis is a disease of the young. Tell me 
where it is wrong.34 
 
If the purpose of the meeting was to convince farmers that the test was 
without problems, it failed: soon after farmers in the Rai Valley began 
petitioning for a halt in the TB testing scheme35. 
 
The West Coast Rules! Resolving Heiferlumps in the Veterinary Borderland  
 
Until the 1970s, bTB diagnostics struggled to move seamlessly from the 
Department’s laboratories to the fields of the West Coast. However, during the 
1970s seemingly opposing veterinary practices coalesced to create new 
hybrid styles of disease control such that the existence of heiferlumps came to 
be accepted. In this sense, the geography of disease became fluid and 
variable. Within this veterinary borderland, approaches to disease flowed into 
each other making them inseparable, but the degree of this flow varied 
throughout New Zealand. Whilst non-specificity was central to the opening up 
of this veterinary borderland, it also owed much to the skills of veterinary 
epidemiologists who began working on the West Coast in the 1970s, as well 
as the involvement of farmers in the production of veterinary knowledge to 
manage bTB. By 1970, Jamieson had retired and replaced by new staff with 
epidemiological training. For people like Paul Livingstone, the Regional 
Veterinary Officer posted to the West Coast in 1974, the problems of non-
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specificity were undeniable and the effects of the heiferlump problem were still 
being felt by farmers struggling to manage their businesses (Animal Health 
Board., 2012). Farmers had proposed various theories about non-specificity 
on the West Coast. Some believed that heiferlumps were the result of age-
related biological changes and stress brought on by a wet climate. A common 
theory was that environmental factors on the West Coast caused some cattle 
to react and not others. Specifically, farmers thought heiferlumps were down 
to the presence of sphagnum moss on the West Coast that supported 
mycobacteria and sensitised cattle to the bTB test. These lay epidemiologies 
suggested a more complex geography of disease, but in seeking to get the 
bTB programme to work across New Zealand, different styles of veterinary 
practice merged to form a new approach. 
One solution to the problem of heiferlumps and non-specificity was the 
development of the ‘West Coast Rules’. Livingstone had arrived on the West 
Coast to be confronted by the problem of non-specificity that the Department 
had denied for so long. Collating statistics of breakdowns and the ages of 
cattle infected, he returned to the Department in Wellington to show how their 
approach was ‘wiping farmers out’36. To resolve the heiferlump problem, a 
new set of procedures – the West Coast Rules – were proposed, based on 
the epidemiological analysis of cattle ages testing positive for bTB in the 
region. The rules meant that cattle under 3 years old displaying heiferlumps 
would be retested after 6 months. The approach saved the slaughter of 
around 70% of heifers reacting to the bTB test. Ironically, the West Coast 
rules were largely what Peter Malone had been calling for ten years earlier, 
but they didn’t reflect a wholesale shift to his local and situated understanding 
of bTB. If Malone’s interpretation of non-specificity was a form of ‘local 
universality’ (Enticott, 2012), the West Coast rules were situated at a larger 
spatial scale. Set against the rest of New Zealand, the West Coast was seen 
as an exceptional environment in which accommodations needed to be made. 
In the West Coast rules, the accommodations of the clinic were married with 
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the wider ambitions of epidemiology. In this veterinary borderland, disease 
practices sat comfortably within each other making their distinctions irrelevant. 
The marriage of different disease practices reflected a changing relationship 
between Departmental vets and farmers. There was a growing feeling in the 
Department that disease control could only be successful if it was based on 
social as well as technical decisions. Rather, the recognition of non-specific 
environmental and biological factors went hand in hand with reframing bTB as 
a social problem requiring social work. Unlike Jamieson, Livingstone’s 
approach ‘was not to go out and bang the table and frighten people. He would 
try and find a way to satisfy as many people as possible’37. The relationship 
between farmers and the Department had deteriorated to such an extent that 
any approach to managing the disease would need to address farmers’ 
concerns. In forging a relationship with farmers to understand bTB, 
Livingstone himself recognised a moral duty of care in getting disease control 
to work for farmers as much as the Department: 
‘with me, I was with those guys and you get affected by that – you can 
see what they were going through and how it was affecting them…To 
me it was just morally wrong to be taking [that amount of] cows away 
from them – it was just wrong! In those circumstances you have to do 
something different and so we had to develop our rules’38. 
 
During his time on the West Coast, Livingstone attended many ‘very 
uncomfortable’ meetings with farmers. Until his arrival, the Department had 
denied farmers’ knowledge as unscientific, whilst Jamieson had expressed his 
own discomfort with the possibility that farmers could influence the bTB 
testing regime39. Yet for Livingstone their knowledge was crucial in redefining 
how bTB could be recognised and dealt with: 
‘[farmers] knew a lot about TB and TB testing.  They had lived with it 
for years and they were able to just throw all the stuff at you and you 
had no real answer to them… I mean you’d go along to their meetings 
and they would have those folders full of information which because it 
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affected them they had collected information anything they could and 
combined it into their own experiences…They were gumboot 
epidemiologists.  They were seeing within the field’.40  
 
In this veterinary borderland, listening to and accepting farmers’ ‘gumboot 
epidemiology’ was central to the development of the West Coast rules. It also 
contributed to the development and use of new diagnostic tools. On April 27 
1977, Livingstone wrote to Bawa Singh, the Chief Advisory Officer in the 
Animal Health Division describing a number of West Coast farms with on-
going bTB problems but whose slaughtered cattle continually failed to show 
lesions at post mortem41. Colleagues also offered support: John Muir, another 
Regional Veterinary Officer, wrote to Singh arguing that non-specificity was 
resulting in cases where it was ‘quite unrealistic to slaughter [Caudal Fold 
test] +ves’ because of the cost to farmer confidence. In calling for diagnostics 
that would result in the slaughter of ‘an acceptable number of animals’, Muir 
suggested a ‘longish scale’ trial of the comparative tuberculin test because ‘it 
is accepted by farmers’42. Despite complaining of Livingstone’s ‘incomplete’ 
data, Singh was persuaded and wrote to the Director of the Animal Health 
Division arguing, ‘the only conclusion that can be reached is that most of the 
reactors were non-specifically sensitised’. Singh concluded that, ‘whilst at one 
time I shared the doubts of many others on the possibility of non specific 
sensitisation in an infected herd, it now appears that this in fact is occurring in 
the country’. Soon after, the Department began experimenting with the use of 
alternative forms of ancillary testing43. 
As the emphasis on farmer ‘acceptance’ and ‘confidence’ in Muir’s letter 
suggests, the new style of disease control therefore reflected a shift from a 
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disciplinary style of disease control to one in which the Department was a 
‘moral manager’ (cf. Sinding, 2004) where care acted as a mode of 
syncretism (Law et al., 2014) and the social became as important as the 
scientific. Thus, moral care for the plight of the West Coast farmers led to the 
recognition of farmers’ ‘gumboot epidemiology’ and its incorporation into more 
traditional epidemiological analysis. The resulting hybrid approach recognised 
different forms of expertise, styles of thinking and geographical variations in 
the way bTB could be made visible. Central to this style was a balance 
between different techniques and between different social groups. In this 
balanced approach to disease control, no single view of bTB dominated but its 
definition remained a matter of contingencies: 
‘We try to look at everything.  We accept once upon a time we used to 
think there was a golden bullet, a silver bullet somewhere.  If we could 
only find that silver bullet we would be right.  I now accept that is no 
such thing as a silver bullet and therefore you are trying to maximise 
what you can do with the data that you have got and but also aware 
that if you go too stringent you might last for a period of time and then 
you will lose it big time with the farming community. We have to 
therefore be aware that there is a certain level that you can be tough 
on but if you overstep that too much you are going to lose it…we walk 
that fine line’44.  
 
Importantly, this social and technical balance to disease control was only able 
to evolve in relation to Jamieson’s paternalistic approach to governing bTB. In 
the 1950s, Jamieson had established Regional Animal Health Advisory 
Committees (RAHACs) as a way of educating farmers about bTB. Ironically, 
as bTB became viewed as an issue of moral management, the RAHACs 
increasingly provided opportunities for farmers to influence bTB testing 
procedures. It was through these committees on the West Coast that 
Livingstone was exposed to farmers’ plight and their knowledge and 
experiences of bTB so central to the West Coast rules. Nevertheless, there 
were also times when RAHACs could upset the balance. For example, 
RAHACs could sometimes pressure the Department into using ancillary 
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diagnostics reserved for areas with problems of non-specificity meaning that 
disease management required constant work and adaption.  
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s farmers became increasingly involved in the 
management of bTB, replacing the Department’s paternalistic scheme with 
one in which it acted as an advisor to help farmers find solutions to problems. 
The 1980’s financial crisis in New Zealand accelerated this approach as the 
Government withdrew from funding disease control leading to the creation of a 
new organisation, the Animal Health Board in 1994, to replace the work of the 
Department (Enticott, 2014a). Funded by farmers and Government, with a 
farmer as its chairman, it governed by the maxim “farmer pays, farmer says”. 
Jamieson’s RAHACs became formalised as regional committees providing 
farmers with elected representation and a voice in the national governance of 
bTB in New Zealand. Moreover, as interpretations of disease and styles of 
management became the responsibility of the AHB, so a style of combining 
different veterinary traditions with farmer experiences of disease was 
cemented reflecting the relationship between disease control and the social 
environment in which it was situated:  
‘The difference is in the funding mechanisms: we have to work for 
farmers, so if its not working then we’ve got to do something 
different’45. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In 1985 Sam Jamieson returned to the Department he once ran, this time to 
write its history on its 100th anniversary. His time away had not diminished his 
view of universal bTB and his denial of non-specificity. The unpublished 
manuscript revealed he held no regrets about his handling of the controversy 
surrounding non-specificity. ‘After the storm is over’, he wrote, ‘is there value 
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in looking for the wind that caused it?’46. Whilst the answer for Jamieson was 
no, this paper has shown the answer is likely to be different for geographers.  
 
Firstly, in tracing the practices of animal disease control in New Zealand, the 
paper has sought to explore the paradox of boundaries within animal disease 
control. In focussing on the effects of non-specificity to disease control, the 
paper has shown how the boundaries of disease are not stable but subject to 
unpredictable biological and environmental interferences to disease 
diagnosis. Environmental interferences, such as sphagnum moss on the West 
Coast, disrupt universal geographies of disease. These interferences have not 
been confined to the West Coast: adaptions to testing have been made 
elsewhere, for example, in areas with volcanic soils. In this sense, disease is 
not universal, proves difficult to know in some places and contexts, and its 
definition fluid and changeable. Rather than universal, disease should be 
thought of as comprising of an ever-changing set of social, biological and 
environmental relations highlighting the difficulty of predicting what disease is 
and how it is shaped.  
 
Secondly, exploring veterinary borderlands should also challenge how the 
boundaries of disease control practices are thought of. One legacy of disease 
outbreaks such as FMD has been to fix in the mind the differences between 
different disciplines of disease control and their consequences for farmers and 
their animals. Whereas epidemiology is frequently presented as seeking to 
present a flat undifferentiated landscape of universal rules and fixed ideas of 
disease, the clinic provides an antidote to epidemiology’s excesses of 
universalism. Yet, in veterinary borderlands, these distinctions fail to last. The 
non-specificity of disease prompts thinking about how disciplines themselves 
might be thought of as non-specific and lacking in fixed boundaries. By 
themselves, the practices of the laboratory, epidemiology and the clinic 
produce their own spatial topologies. But there are times when the distinctions 
																																								 																					
46	ACCR	7837	W5124/1	Unpublished	manuscript	on	the	History	of	the	Animal	Health	
Division	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture.	Chapter	3:	Control	of	Indigenous	Infectious	
Diseases,	unpublished	manuscript,	p.32.	(Authors	S.	Jamieson	and	C.	Ensor)	1985.	
between these disciplines rapidly fade, and spaces into which disease can 
flow because of these mutations. These conditions of exchange and 
interaction transform epidemiology into a variable practice to accommodate 
different biological, environmental and social conditions. In this view, it is 
difficult to maintain distinct veterinary traditions or consider them in tension 
with each other. There are no simplistic, binary shifts from the practical clinical 
approach to computer based epidemiological modelling or veterinary practices 
that can be specifically isolated. Neither is it the case that people working in 
disease control find themselves belonging to any of these categories. Rather, 
examining the geographies of disease shows how veterinary practices overlap 
and evolve. The significance of these overlaps suggests that it is perhaps best 
to talk less of specific veterinary traditions and more of the ways and places in 
which disease control practices evolve and are transformed in order for 
disease control to work (Hinchliffe, 2015). This is a continuing task: as Mol 
and Law (1994) suggest, mutations in what counts as disease are continuous, 
varying in time and space. Indeed, in New Zealand, the West Coast Rules did 
not apply everywhere and neither have they lasted forever. Currently in New 
Zealand, there are signs of fluidity in new blood tests developed to combat 
non-specificity (thresholds and boundaries still require interpretation in relation 
to place), but also signs of a managerial approach to disease control in which 
methods have become more formal and universal.  
 
Thirdly, in writing about the borderlands of field and laboratory biology, Kohler 
(2002:  308) concludes that ‘the art…will always be to borrow, adapt and 
blend – and to know the limits of cultural borrowing’. In the veterinary 
borderlands of New Zealand’s West Coast, negotiating the borderlands of 
bTB disease control required the same skills and sensitivities. In particular, 
the paper has shown how different strategies and modes of noncoherence are 
vital to the navigation of veterinary borderlands and the creation of new hybrid 
veterinary practices. For Sam Jamieson, a strategy of denial held opposing 
veterinary practices apart to ensure disease remained universal. By contrast, 
Paul Livingstone was able to combine traditional epidemiology with farmers’ 
gumboot own knowledges and a clinical sensibility, through a ‘moral duty’ of 
care. Acting as a kind of veterinary entrepreneur, and aided by farmers’ 
records, files and numerical inscriptions, Livingstone’s mode of care was 
essential to dissolving the distinctions between disciplines. Analysis of the 
navigation of veterinary borderlands for other animal diseases may also 
reveal the existence of other modes of noncoherence, how these modes 
themselves combine, and the reasons for transitions between them. 
Moreover, what is perhaps of significance for disease control more broadly, is 
an understanding how the skills and sensitivities required to navigate 
veterinary borderlands such as those in the West Coast can be fostered so 
that future challenges of disease control can avoid the binary traps of the 
past.  
 
Finally, analysing veterinary borderlands raises broader questions about the 
transitions and mobility of the modalities of disease control. In short, what can 
be learned from New Zealand by other countries seeking to control animal 
disease? Can the kinds of rapproachments made in the veterinary borderland 
offer solutions to other disease outbreaks? In the case of bTB, the evolution of 
veterinary practices raises questions about the roles played by different social 
actors in agricultural, veterinary and policy communities. The co-production of 
solutions to the problem of heiferlumps in the West Coast can be seen as an 
early form of what Catley et al. (2012) call ‘participatory epidemiology’: an 
approach to disease control that recognises the value of different forms of 
knowledge. It might be tempting to conclude that co-productive styles of 
disease control could be applied to the problems of bTB in the UK, helping to 
resolve tensions in disease management by ensuring farmers’ voices are fully 
incorporated into disease management practices (Enticott, 2008). This, 
however, is no easy challenge: the evolution of New Zealand’s bTB control 
strategy is embedded and reflective of its own social and environmental 
context. Such an approach is demanding: it calls for reflexivity and humility 
amongst disease control experts (Leach & Scoones, 2013) and raises wider 
questions over which farmers and kinds of farming are able to reshape 
disease and for what purpose. Indeed, the solutions developed to non-
specificity in New Zealand were not accepted uncritically: not all farmers 
believed in it, and some have blamed the new rules for the continued high 
incidence of bTB in the West Coast. More generally, as productivist and post-
productivist styles of agriculture increasingly represent divergent agricultural 
futures (Marsden & Morley, 2014), so might it be increasingly difficult to 
reconcile the aims of animal disease policy, making challenges to universal 
approaches to animal disease – of the kind witnessed in New Zealand – 
harder to orchestrate. In a context of agricultural change and the spread of 
new animal diseases as a consequence of climate change (Godfray et al., 
2010), accounting for heiferlumps in veterinary borderlands therefore has 
broader relevance to the future of agriculture and the control of animal 
disease. 
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